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The Military’s Ban on Consensual Sodomy in a  
Post-Lawrence World 
Jeremy J. Gray* 
INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Marcum1 and United States v. Stirewalt,2 the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) upheld the 
conviction of armed servicemembers for violating Article 1253 
(“Article 125”) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by 
engaging in consensual sodomy with another member of the armed 
forces.4 In reaching these decisions, the CAAF determined that the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas,5 which 
invalidated state criminal sanctions against private and consensual 
acts of sodomy, did not provide a “facial” challenge to the military’s 
ban on sodomy.6 This means that constitutional objections to Article 
125 must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.7 In both Marcum and 
Stirewalt, the CAAF found that the military’s ban on sodomy was 
constitutional as applied to the defendants.8  
Contrary to these rulings, the CAAF should have declared Article 
125 unconstitutional because its proscription on sodomy is not in 
keeping with Lawrence, which recognized a right to private sexual 
 
 * J.D. (2006), Washington University School of Law. I would like to thank the tireless 
efforts of the SLDN and ACLU in fighting for equal rights in the military and beyond. 
Additionally, I would like to thank my friends, family, and the entire faculty of Washington 
University; all have aided me in ways I may never truly appreciate. 
 1. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
 2. 60 M.J. 297 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
 3. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2005) (“Article 125”). Under Article 125, the military has formally 
banned the practice of sodomy, whether consensual or not. 
 4. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 305; Marcum, 60 M.J. at 200. 
 5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 6. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304; Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206. 
 7. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304; Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206. 
 8. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304; Marcum, 60 M.J. at 208. 
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acts between consenting adults. Further, because the military could 
have prosecuted both defendants under alternative UCMJ articles, 
there is no reason to continue prosecuting servicemembers under 
Article 125. 
Part I of this Note addresses the background of the CAAF’s 
decisions in Marcum and Stirewalt.9 Part II focuses on the 
foundations and historical antecedents of the military’s ban on 
sodomy, including military court decisions that explain the military’s 
position. Part III explores the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bowers v. 
Hardwick,10 the military’s interpretation of that decision, and 
detractors of the military’s ban on sodomy. Part IV briefly discusses 
the Court’s decision in Lawrence, and more specifically the 
implications of this decision on statutory bans on sodomy. Finally, 
Part V analyzes the CAAF’s decisions in Marcum and Stirewalt, and 
concludes that both decisions were incorrect in light of Lawrence. 
Part V also provides policy alternatives that would place military law 
in better harmony with Supreme Court decisions and address 
secondary issues that affect military members charged with sodomy. 
I. SETTING THE STAGE: CAAF INTERPRETATION OF LAWRENCE IN 
THE MILITARY CONTEXT 
A. Marcum, Homosexual Sodomy, and Post-Lawrence Interpretations 
While several different charges were levied against Technical 
Sergeant (TSgt) Marcum (E-6),11 the CAAF only reviewed the charge 
of nonconsensual sodomy with Senior Airman (SrA) Harrison (E-4), 
who had initially reported the incident to authorities.12 Although 
 
 9. This Note will only focus on those issues dealing with the consensual sodomy ban. 
Additional issues addressed by the CAAF on appeal will be discussed inasmuch as they relate 
to the issue of the military sodomy ban. 
 10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 11. TSgt Marcum was a supervising non-commissioned officer of intelligence analysts; 
his duties included supervising and training new airmen. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 200. He was 
charged with and convicted of “dereliction of duty by providing alcohol to individuals under the 
age of 21, non-forcible sodomy, forcible sodomy, assault consummated by a battery, indecent 
assault and three specifications of committing indecent acts in violation of Articles 92, 125, 
128, and 134 [of the UCMJ].” Id. at 199. 
 12. Id. at 200. When TSgt Marcum was off-duty, he socialized often with airmen from his 
unit at parties, and, afterwards, airmen often spent the night at his off-base home. Id. The 
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convicted of nonconsensual sodomy, a panel of officers and other 
enlisted members determined that TSgt Marcum was “not guilty of 
forcible sodomy but guilty of non-forcible sodomy” against SrA 
Harrison.13 Irrespective of the determination that his conduct was 
consensual, the panel noted that it is nonetheless prohibited by 
Article 125.14  
On appeal, TSgt Marcum argued that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lawrence effectively rendered Article 125 
unconstitutional, and thus that his conviction for non-forcible sodomy 
should be reversed.15 Comparing by analogy the Texas statute at 
issue in Lawrence with the military ban on sodomy, TSgt Marcum 
argued that “Article 125 suffers from the same constitutional 
deficiencies . . . because both statutes criminalize private consensual 
acts of sodomy between adults.”16 The CAAF disagreed with this 
comparison because the military ban on sodomy proscribed far more 
 
charges against TSgt Marcum of consensual and nonconsensual sodomy stem from allegations 
levied by the subordinate airmen who stayed at TSgt Marcum’s home. Id. Only the charges 
relating to his relationship with SrA Harrison were discussed on appeal. Id. 
 13. Id. at 201. During the initial trial, there was conflicting testimony concerning the 
incident. SrA Harrison testified that he had been sleeping and awoke to TSgt Marcum 
performing oral sex on him. Id. TSgt Marcum, on the other hand, testified to the opposite, and 
claimed that he did not use “force, coercion, pressure, intimidation or violence” to engage in 
any activities. Id. Further, TSgt Marcum claimed that all activity between himself and SrA 
Harrison was “equally participatory.” Id. However, SrA Harrison claimed that he was very 
upset and left the apartment soon after the incident took place. Id. 
 SrA Harrison testified that, subsequent to this incident, he and TSgt Marcum “danced 
together and kissed each other in the ‘European custom of men.’” Id. He also told TSgt Marcum 
that “he loved him, bought him a t-shirt, and sent him numerous e-mails.” Id. In addition, prior 
to the incident at controversy, TSgt Marcum and SrA Harrison both testified to an incident in 
which SrA Harrison attempted to be intimate with TSgt Marcum. Id.  
 14. Id. Article 125 states: 
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with 
another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. 
Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense. 
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
10 U.S.C. § 925 (2005). The Manual for Courts-Martial lists the elements of the offense of 
sodomy: “(1) That the accused engaged in unnatural carnal copulation with a certain other 
person or with an animal. (2) That the act was done with a child under the age of 16. (3) That 
the act was done by force and without the consent of the other person.” UNITED STATES 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL IV-79, ¶ 51.b.(1)-(3) (2002) [hereinafter COURT MARTIAL 
MANUAL]. 
 15. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 202. 
 16. Id. 
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conduct than just consensual sodomy.17 However, the CAAF did look 
to Lawrence to determine the proper standard of review for 
challenging Article 125 prosecutions.18 
At the outset, the CAAF determined that, in the military 
environment, Lawrence requires a limited review of constitutional 
challenges to Article 125.19 It then noted that “servicemembers, as a 
general matter, do not share the same autonomy as civilians.”20 In 
addition, “an understanding of military culture and mission cautions 
against sweeping constitutional pronouncements that may not 
account for the nuance of military life.”21 These observations led the 
CAAF to use a “contextual, as applied analysis, rather than facial 
review,” of Article 125.22 
 
 17. Id. at 206. The court argued that while constitutional rights identified by the Supreme 
Court are generally applicable to members of the military, it would consider only the 
application of Lawrence to the conduct of TSgt Marcum specifically. Id. Citing Sabri v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004), the court held that any challenge to Article 125 must be done in the 
context of the facts of the case, and not as a facial challenge to the statute. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 
206. Noting that Article 125 encompasses both forcible and non-forcible sodomy, the court 
determined that “a facial challenge reaches too far” because “the Lawrence analysis is not at 
issue with respect to forcible sodomy.” Id.  
 18. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206. 
 19. The CAAF held that Lawrence was unclear with respect to the standard of review that 
should be employed in determining whether Article 125 is permissible. Under the Supreme 
Court’s decision, either strict-scrutiny analysis or rational-basis review could be employed 
when analyzing sodomy statutes. Id. at 204–05. The CAAF interpreted this ambiguity as 
requiring a bifurcated analysis in which a court must determine if “the activity at issue falls 
within column A—conduct of a nature to bring it within the liberty interest identified in 
Lawrence, or within column B—factors identified by the Supreme Court as outside its 
Lawrence analysis.” Id. at 205. To support this position, the CAAF noted that the Court of 
Appeals of Arizona determined that the Lawrence Court employed “‘the rational basis test, 
rather than the strict scrutiny review utilized when fundamental rights are impinged.’” Id. at 204 
(quoting Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)). However, the 
CAAF also noted that California courts concluded that the Lawrence Court identified a 
“fundamental right . . . implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment,” which necessitates strict-
scrutiny review. Id. (quoting Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221 n.7 
(C.D. Cal. 2003)). To settle these differing interpretations, the CAAF determined that because 
the “Supreme Court declined in the civilian context to expressly identify such a fundamental 
right [they would] not presume the existence of such a fundamental right in the military 
environment.” Id. at 205 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. at 206. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 205. Thus, when reviewing a conviction for non-forcible sodomy, a military 
court should ask “whether Article 125 is constitutional as applied to Appellant’s conduct.” Id. at 
206. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/15
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To determine if Article 125 is constitutional as applied in a 
particular case, the CAAF developed a test by which a military court 
must evaluate the charge. First, the court must ask whether the 
conduct falls within the individual’s liberty interest, as defined by the 
Supreme Court.23 Second, the court must determine whether there are 
any factors that would place the conduct outside of the Lawrence 
analysis.24 Finally, the court must question whether there is a military 
reason to prohibit the conduct.25 This analysis permits a military 
court to look at each charge of sodomy as “a discrete criminal 
conviction based on a discrete set of facts,” and preserves the statute 
as a general proscription on sodomy, whether forcible and 
consensual.26 
The CAAF reasoned that due to TSgt Marcum’s status as SrA 
Harrison’s superior, the sodomy at issue was not protected under 
Lawrence.27 The court held that the relationship fell within the 
exceptions noted in the Supreme Court’s decision, namely, that SrA 
Harrison may have been coerced or in a relationship in which consent 
may not be refused.28 In addition, the CAAF found that general 
military principles supported the proscription of sodomy in this 
case.29 Specifically, Air Force regulations forbid fraternization 
between superiors and subordinates.30 Therefore, Tsgt Marcum and 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 206–07. 
 26. Id. at 206. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 208. The court explained that the prohibition against sexual contact between 
superiors and subordinates exists because a subordinate is “in a military position where ‘consent 
might not easily be refused.’” Id. at 200 (citations omitted). 
 29. Id. at 207.  
 30. Id. The relevant Air Force instruction in place at the time stated:  
 Unduly familiar relationships between members in which one member exercises 
supervisory or command authority over the other can easily be or become 
unprofessional. Similarly, as differences in grade increase, even in the absence of a 
command or supervisory relationship, there may be more risk that the relationship will 
be, or be perceived to be unprofessional because senior members in military 
organizations normally exercise authority or some direct or indirect organizational 
influence over more junior members. 
. . . . 
 Relationships are unprofessional, whether pursued on or off-duty, when they detract 
from the authority of superiors or result in, or reasonably create the appearance of, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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SrA Harrison’s conduct hindered military interests, which placed the 
conduct outside the liberty interest protected in Lawrence.31  
B. Stirewalt and Consensual Heterosexual Sodomy Between Military 
Members 
Health Services Technician (HST) Stirewalt (E-5) was convicted 
of engaging in consensual sodomy with a service woman of higher 
rank (E-6), who was stationed at the same base as the defendant.32 
The CAAF, faced with a heterosexual challenge to the military 
sodomy ban, applied Marcum and determined that the sodomy ban 
was constitutional in this case as well.33 Unlike in Marcum, however, 
there was no conflicting testimony concerning the consensual nature 
of the sodomy; it was clearly consensual.34 Also unlike in Marcum, 
HST Stirewalt was charged with permitting a superior officer to 
commit sodomy on him.35 
Like in Marcum, however, the CAAF relied on the military 
relationship of the defendant to the other party. The CAAF agreed, 
arguendo, that the defendant’s actions fell “within the liberty interest 
identified by the Supreme Court and [did] not encompass behavior or 
factors outside the Lawrence analysis.”36 The key for the court in 
determining that the application of Article 125 was constitutional was 
that the sodomy occurred between two servicemembers, outside of 
marriage.37 The CAAF determined that because the Coast Guard 
 
favoritism, misuse of office or position, or the abandonment of organizational goals for 
personal interests. 
Id. (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force Instruction, 36-2909 Professional and Unprofessional 
Relationships ¶¶ 2.2, 3.1 (May 1, 1996)). The court noted that this instruction was in place to 
“avoid partiality, preferential treatment, and the improper use of one’s rank.” Id. By invoking 
the chain of command both to prevent the application of Lawrence and as a military-life 
exemption to constitutional analysis, the court is able to further strengthen its position. 
 31. Id. at 206. 
 32. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 303–04. 
 33. Id.; see also supra notes 23, 24, and 25 and accompanying text (stating Marcum’s 
three-part test).  
 34. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. The court ignored the first and second prongs of the Marcum test, but found that 
“Stirewalt’s conduct . . . squarely implicates the third prong of the framework [which] asks 
whether there are additional factors that are relevant solely in the military environment.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/15
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prohibited relationships between members within the same chain of 
command, the consensual sodomy was illegal.38 Noting that the 
prohibition against fraternization was for “discipline and order,” the 
conviction for sodomy was upheld as a “matter of military 
discipline.”39 
Both Marcum and Stirewalt squarely reflect that consensual 
sodomy is still illegal under Article 125. Although factually 
dissimilar, both cases relied upon the nature of the relationship 
between the servicemembers who engaged in sodomy to hold that 
their actions fell outside of the constitutional protection identified in 
Lawrence. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the history and nature 
of the military ban on sodomy and the rationales for its retention to 
determine if the CAAF’s interpretation of Article 125 is, in fact, 
consistent with Lawrence. 
II. HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION: THE SODOMY BAN’S EXPANDING 
INTERPRETATION OVER TIME 
A. The History of Sodomy Bans in the U.S. Military 
The CAAF’s predecessor, the Court of Military Appeals,40 once 
noted that some forms of sodomy have been banned in the military 
 
 38. Id. The court found that “Stirewalt’s conduct with [LTJG B] was more than a personal 
consensual relationship in the privacy of an off-base apartment. At the time of this relationship, 
[LTJG B] was one of seven officers on the USCGC SWEETGUM, a cutter with a crew of only 
42. The conduct in question occurred between a commissioned department head and her 
subordinate enlisted crew member. . . .” Id. The relevant Coast Guard regulation states:  
Romantic relationships between members are unacceptable when: 
(1) Members have a supervisor and subordinate relationship . . ., or (2) Members are 
assigned to the same small shore unit (less than 60 members), or (3) Members are 
assigned to the same cutter . . . The nature of operations and personnel interactions on 
cutters and small shore units makes romantic relationships between members assigned 
to such units the equivalent of relationships in the chain of command and, therefore, 
unacceptable. This policy applies regardless of rank, grade, or position. 
Id. (quoting Coast Guard Personnel Manual ¶ 8.H.2.f. (1988)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Congress designated the Court of Military Appeals as the CAAF in 1994. Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces, Establishment of the Court, http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/ 
Establis.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). 
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“since time immemorial.”41 Article 125 has its roots in the British 
Articles of War, adopted by the First Continental Congress,42 which 
prohibited “sodomy and other unnatural crimes.”43 In 1920, Congress 
amended the Articles of War to create Article 93, which specifically 
listed sodomy as a punishable offense.44 In 1950, Congress enacted 
the UCMJ.45 This included Article 125 and the offense of sodomy.46 
Article 125, unchanged since its codification, proscribes all 
“unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or 
opposite sex or with an animal.”47  
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Breadth of Article 125 
Military tribunals accede that “Congress intended to proscribe a 
more general range of conduct than the origin of the term [sodomy] 
might suggest.”48 The CAAF held that, although historical statutes 
against sodomy usually proscribed intercourse per-anum, Congress 
changed the language of the original Articles of War in enacting 
Article 125, thereby demonstrating “a legislative intention to define 
sodomy as including acts other than those within the scope of its 
common-law definition.”49 In explaining the history of Article 125, 
the CAAF held that the legislative intent of the military ban on 
sodomy was to include both heterosexual and homosexual conduct, 
 
 41. United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174, 176 (C.A.A.F. 1992). 
 42. See JAMES E. VALLE, ROCKS & SHOALS: NAVAL DISCIPLINE IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING 
SAIL 40–41 (1980).  
 43. United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52, 53 (C.M.A. 1979). This prohibition was housed in 
Article 96 of the Articles of War. The Court of Military Affairs also noted that the crimes it 
proscribed “all carried the same maximum punishment.” Id. 
 44. Id.; see also Act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. 812. 
 45. Harris, 8 M.J. at 53. Congress, however, failed to define what sodomy entailed. 
 46. See supra note 3. 
 47. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2005). 
 48. United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174, 176 (C.A.A.F. 1992). 
 49. Harris, 8 M.J. at 54.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/15
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per-os and per-anum.50 Thus, the reach of Article 125 is far greater 
than its historical antecedents.51 
The CAAF has upheld convictions under the sodomy statute 
irrespective of the relationship between the members who engaged in 
the violation. For example, in United States v. Harris and United 
States v. Scoby, the CAAF described the breadth of Article 125 and 
held that it prohibits both consensual and nonconsensual sodomy.52 In 
Scoby, the CAAF also disposed of constitutional challenges based on 
the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy.53 In addition, lower 
military courts have held that marital bonds do not affect the 
application of Article 125 to military personnel.54  
The CAAF has acknowledged that, while the scope of Article 125 
is broad, there is no indication that private acts of sodomy are 
harmful to the military environment.55 Moreover, in the 1990s, 
 
 50. See generally Harris, 8 M.J. at 54–58 (providing a detailed history and legislative 
analysis of Article 125 and its predecessors). In the late 1990s, a lower military tribunal held 
that there is also no right for married individuals to engage in private, consensual sodomy. See 
United States v. Kulow, No. NMCM 96 01253, 1997 CCA LEXIS 484, at *29 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 
App. Aug. 29, 1997). 
 51. Interpretation of Article 125 has been fairly consistent since its codification. Drawing 
on historical interpretations of laws against sodomy, military courts have held that “sodomy 
consists of a person taking into his or her mouth or anus the sexual organ of any other person or 
animal or placing his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of any other person or animal.” 
See, e.g., Harris, 8 M.J. at 58; see also COURT MARTIAL MANUAL, supra note 14, Pt. IV, ¶ 51b. 
Although the language of the statute proscribes “sodomy” without definition, the CAAF has 
found that the definition is not vague. It has ruled that the sodomy ban withstands vagueness 
challenges because “unnatural carnal copulation” has historical antecedents in English common 
law, thereby giving sufficient notice of what activities are proscribed. United States v. Scoby, 5 
M.J. 160, 161–63 (C.M.A. 1978). 
 52. Harris, 8 M.J. at 53–59. At issue in Harris was whether cunnilinguis was proscribed 
by Article 125; the court agreed that it was. Id. at 54. In Scoby, the court described the breadth 
of Article 125:  
[It] prohibits every kind of unnatural carnal intercourse, whether accomplished by 
force or fraud, or with consent. Similarly, the article does not distinguish between an 
act committed in the privacy of one’s home, with no person present other than the 
sexual partner, and the same act committed in a public place in front of a group of 
strangers, who fully apprehend the nature of the act. 
Scoby, 5 M.J. at 163. 
 53. Scoby, 5 M.J. at 163–66.  
 54. See, e.g., Kulow, 1997 CCA LEXIS 484, at *29 (holding that marriage does not 
insulate servicemembers from prosecution under Article 125). 
 55. Scoby, 5 M.J. at 165 (“The background material on the adoption of the UCMJ 
indicates Congress made no findings as to the possible harmful consequences of privately 
performed sexual acts upon the military community.”). 
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military courts acknowledged that convictions for consensual sodomy 
are difficult to uphold because there is not much justification for such 
a ban.56 However, the military’s ability to proscribe sodomy while 
avoiding constitutional challenge was bolstered by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.57 
III. BOWERS AND MILITARY APPLICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 
UPHOLDING OF SODOMY STATUTES 
Bowers is a civilian case involving a Georgia statute that made 
consensual sodomy illegal. The Supreme Court upheld the statute, 
holding that it neither violated the individual’s right to privacy nor 
his right to due process.58 This decision served as the basis for the 
 
 56. See United States v. Fagg, 34 M.J. 179, 180 (C.M.A. 1992) (“[W]e may sympathize 
with the accused regarding this particular conviction for what was unquestionably consensual 
conduct.”); see also Kulow, 1997 CCA LEXIS 484, at *36 (“Had this offense been charged as 
consensual sodomy I would find it more troubling than I do in its present context. . . .”).  
 57. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 (1986). 
 58. Id. at 194. Although the Court ostensibly limited its decision to instances of 
homosexual sodomy, the historic ban on all acts of sodomy was important to its analysis. Id. at 
192–94. The Court noted that a heterosexual couple was also a party to the original proceeding; 
however, they had been dismissed because “they had neither sustained, nor were in immediate 
danger of sustaining, any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute.” Id. at 188 n.2. The 
Court further noted that they “express[ed] no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia 
statute as applied to other [e.g., heterosexual] acts of sodomy.” Id. The Court also examined the 
pervasiveness of anti-sodomy statutes in history, which, in its opinion, bolstered the argument 
for the statute’s constitutionality because there was no indication that legal sodomy was “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at 
194 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, a more liberal reading of Bowers suggests that the 
Court may have been willing to accept of an across-the-board ban on sodomy, irrespective of 
sexual preference. 
 In its discussion of the standard of review applicable to sodomy statutes, the Court stated 
that it was attempting “to identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial 
protection.” Id. at 191. The Court explained that, in identifying these rights, it must “assure 
itself and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution’s text 
involve[d] much more than the imposition of the Justices’ own choice of values on the States 
and the Federal Government.” Id. Further, the Court demonstrated reticence in taking “a more 
expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due 
Process Clause.” Id. at 194. 
 In addition, the Court addressed the issue of the location of the conduct. It stated that it 
does not matter if the conduct was carried out in private or in public because “illegal conduct is 
not always immunized whenever it occurs in the home.” Id. at 195. The Court further justified 
this position by arguing that if sodomy were legal, it would be difficult to justify criminal 
sanctions against “adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are committed in 
the home. . . . [The Court stated that it was] unwilling to start down that road.” Id. at 196. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/15
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CAAF’s decisions upholding Article 125’s constitutionality in the 
1990s.59 
Although homosexuality and homosexual sodomy have 
consistently been considered in opposition to military standards, the 
CAAF, interpreting Bowers, held that heterosexual sodomy was also 
impermissible under Article 125. In the companion cases of United 
States v. Fagg and United States v. Henderson, the CAAF held that 
Article 125 unmistakably prohibited sodomy between adults—
whether homosexual or heterosexual.60 In Fagg, the primary 
appellate court “recognize[d] a constitutional zone of privacy for 
heterosexual, noncommercial, private acts of oral sex between 
consenting adults[, and] [s]ince that right to privacy [wa]s not 
outweighed by any compelling governmental interest,” overturned 
the convictions for sodomy.61 In direct conflict with Fagg, the 
primary appellate court in Henderson found no such constitutional 
zone of privacy.62  
To correct the split among the military branch appellate courts, the 
CAAF upheld the convictions for consensual sodomy.63 Citing 
Bowers as controlling precedent, the CAAF held that there was no 
reason to assume that the military ban on sodomy was 
constitutionally impermissible.64 The court stated that, absent an 
“indication from the Supreme Court which permits us to override the 
intent of Congress,” the military ban on sodomy must be upheld.65  
 
 59. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174, 177 (C.A.A.F. 1992) (noting that 
the Bowers Court “found no fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual 
sodomy”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 60. Fagg, 34 M.J. at 180; Henderson, 34 M.J. at 178. 
 61. United States v. Fagg, 33 M.J. 618, 619 (A.F.C.M.R. 1992), rev’d, Fagg, 34 M.J. at 
180. 
 62. United States v. Henderson, 32 M.J. 941 (N-M.C.M.R. 1991), aff’d, Henderson, 34 
M.J. at 178. The Navy-Marine Court of Military Review held that Article 125’s proscription of 
heterosexual sodomy was neither unconstitutionally vague nor impermissible in light of 
Bowers. Id. 
 63. Fagg, 34 M.J. at 180; Henderson, 34 M.J. at 178. 
 64. Henderson, 34 M.J. at 178 (finding no reason to “invalidate” the charge of sodomy as 
unconstitutional). 
 65. Fagg, 34 M.J. at 180. In Henderson, the CAAF reviewed Bowers at length, given that 
the cases on review involved consensual, heterosexual sodomy rather than consensual, 
homosexual sodomy. Henderson, 34 M.J. at 177–78. The CAAF, while noting that the Supreme 
Court left open the question of whether heterosexual sodomy should be legal, was reticent to 
Washington University Open Scholarship










390 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 21:379 
 
 
While the CAAF has consistently upheld Article 125’s ban on 
sodomy, these decisions are not without their detractors. In a 2001 
report on the UCMJ, Honorable Walter Cox, former Chief Judge of 
the CAAF, and four other commissioners (the “Cox Commission”) 
argued that the military’s categorical ban on sodomy should be 
removed from the UCMJ.66 The Cox Commission noted that sodomy 
prosecution by the military had been “treated in an arbitrary, even 
vindictive, manner” and should be replaced with criminal codes more 
similar to the Model Penal Code or to Title 18 of the United States 
Code.67 These recommendations are especially interesting because, 
 
find a substantive right where none had before been recognized. Id. at 177. The court went 
further to explain:  
The Legislative Branch, of course, is free to modify its statute if it chooses, and the 
Executive could limit prosecution. As a court, however, we are not involved in the 
merits of the policy. We interpret statutes; and we can strike them down only when 
they violate the Constitution. We perceive no such basis to invalidate this charge. 
Id. at 178. 
 66. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF 
MILITARY JUSTICE § III(d) (2001), available at http://www.badc.org/html/militarylaw_cox.html 
[hereinafter COX COMMISSION].  
 67. Id. The Commission noted that the “well-known fact that most adulterous or 
sodomitical acts committed by consenting and often married (to each other) military personnel 
are not prosecuted at court-martial creates [this] powerful perception.” Id. Some commentators 
argue that this observation lacks justification. See, e.g., Lt. Col. Theodore Essex & Maj. Leslea 
Tate Pickle, A Reply to the Report of the Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (May 2001): “The Cox Commission,” 52 A.F. L. REV. 233, 259 
(2002). Essex and Pickle suggest that the sodomy ban is not applied arbitrarily; rather, they 
argue that any perception of arbitrary, vindictive application is due to well orchestrated media 
campaigns. Id. Modification of the UMJC based only on these misperceptions, they argue, 
“may well result in a system that is less responsive to good order and discipline and casts even 
more discredit upon the military by demonstrating that we no longer hold our members to the 
high standard of morality and ethics the American people expect of their military.” Id. at 259-
60. 
 The Model Penal Code (MPC) provision on sodomy provides: 
(2) “Sexual intercourse” includes intercourse per os or per anum, with some 
penetration however slight; emission is not required; 
(3) “Deviate sexual intercourse” means sexual intercourse per os or per anum between 
human beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of sexual intercourse with 
an animal. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0 (1962). 
(1) A person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person, or who 
causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, commits a felony of the second 
degree if: 
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 (a) he compels the other person to participate by force of by threat of imminent 
death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or 
 (b) he has substantially impaired the other person’s power to appraise or control his 
conduct, by administering or employing without the knowledge of the other person 
drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or 
 (c) the other person is unconscious; or 
 (d) the other person is less than 10 years old. 
(2) By Other Imposition. A person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another person, or who causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, 
commits a felony of the third degree if: 
 (a) he compels the other person to participate by any threat that would prevent 
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution; or  
 (b) he knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or defect which 
renders him incapable of appraising the nature of his conduct; or  
 (c) he knows that the other person submits because he is unaware that a sexual act is 
being committed upon him.  
Id. § 213.2. 
 The relevant sections of Title 18 provide: 
(a) Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or 
in a Federal prison, knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act— 
 (1) by using force against that other person; or 
 (2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be 
subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or attempts to do so, shall be 
fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. 
(b) By other means. Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly— 
 (1) renders another person unconscious and thereby engages in a sexual act with that 
other person; or 
 (2) administers to another person by force or threat of force, or without the 
knowledge or permission of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance 
and thereby— 
  (A) substantially impairs the ability of that other person to appraise or control 
conduct; and 
  (B) engages in a sexual act with that other person; or attempts to do so, shall be 
fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2005). 
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a 
Federal prison, knowingly— 
(1) causes another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other 
person in fear (other than by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any 
person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping); or 
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during his tenure as Chief Judge of the CAAF, Judge Cox upheld the 
categorical ban on sodomy, writing both the Henderson and Fagg 
opinions.68  
Relatively little scholarly analysis has been done of Article 125 
and the military ban on sodomy. However, post-Bowers, one military 
scholar, Major Eugene E. Baime, discussed the ban on sodomy and 
found that there is minimal justification for the sodomy statute as 
applied to individuals engaged in such acts in the privacy of their 
homes.69 Arguing that military personnel have a right to privacy, 
Major Baime reasoned that there is no justification for proscribing 
private, consensual sodomy.70 Further, even in light of the uniqueness 
of the military environment, there are no compelling reasons to 
 
(2) engages in a sexual act with another person if that other person is— 
 (A) incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct; or 
 (B) physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating 
unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under 
this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 
Id. § 2242. 
(2) [T]he term “sexual act” means— 
 (A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for 
purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, 
however slight; 
 (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth 
and the anus; 
 (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a 
hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or 
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or 
 (D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another 
person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, 
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person[.] 
Id. § 2246. 
 68. See United States v. Gates, 40 M.J. 354, 354 (C.M.A. 1994) (opinion by C.J. Cox) 
(“[W]e are no more free now than we were 2 years ago to reject the clear proscription of 
Congress in Article 125.”); Fagg, 34 M.J. at 180 (opinion by C.J. Cox); Henderson, 34 M.J. at 
178 (opinion by C.J. Cox).  
 69. See Major Eugene E. Baime, Private Consensual Sodomy Should Be Constitutionally 
Protected in the Military by the Right to Privacy, 171 MIL. L. REV. 91 (2002). Maj. Baime 
argues that “[s]ervice members have a constitutional right to privacy, which protects their 
ability to engage in private consensual sodomy with another adult.” Id. at 133.  
 70. Id.  
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uphold the ban.71 After surveying military history, Major Baime 
concluded that “[i]t is disingenuous to argue that private consensual 
sodomy is prejudicial to good order and discipline or service 
discrediting,” because consensual, private sodomy “causes no harm 
to anyone or any military unit [and does not] compel other[s] to look 
with disfavor upon the military.”72 
IV. THE ADVENT OF LAWRENCE AND CHALLENGES TO CATEGORICAL 
SODOMY BANS 
A. Finding a Right to Privacy in Intimacy Between Consenting Adults 
In 2003, the Supreme Court significantly hindered the ability of 
states and the federal government to outlaw private, consensual 
sexual acts between adults. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court 
overturned a Texas statute prohibiting same-sex individuals from 
engaging in sodomy.73 The Court, instead of focusing only on the 
homosexual nature of the conduct,74 cast the question as “whether the 
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the 
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”75 Explicitly overruling Bowers,76 the Court 
 
 71. Id. at 129–32. This argument was based on the CAAF’s own acknowledgement that 
“Congress made no findings as to the possible harmful consequences of privately performed 
sexual acts upon the military community.” Id. at 95 n.30 (citing United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J. 
160, 165 (C.M.A. 1978)). 
 72. Id. at 131. 
 73. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 74. The majority opinion, in reference to the Bowers Court’s characterization of the 
question at issue as the right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy, argued: 
That statement . . . discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the 
liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in 
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would 
demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have 
sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that 
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and 
purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most 
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. 
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being 
punished as criminals.  
Id. at 567. 
 75. Id. at 564. The Court maintained that its decision was applicable to homosexual and 
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held that individuals have a fundamental privacy interest in 
consensual relationships engaged in while not in public.77 
The standard of review employed by the Lawrence Court in 
overruling the Texas statute has led to differing interpretations of the 
protection that the decision offers. The Court explicitly stated that it 
was ruling on due process grounds.78 In addition, the Court 
considered the result to be part of the right to privacy and a line of 
cases utilizing the strict scrutiny standard of review to invalidate state 
laws that violate this right.79 However, the Court noted that there may 
be exceptions to this general liberty interest, and it identified 
categories of sodomy that may still be subject to criminal laws.80 The 
 
heterosexual conduct. In admonishing the Bowers Court for limiting its inquiry to whether 
homosexuals possess the fundamental right to engage in sodomy, the majority argued that the 
real issue was whether “[t]he statutes . . . seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is 
within the liberty of persons to choose.” Id. at 567. The Court noted that sodomy laws had their 
historical roots in English criminal law, where they “include[d] relations between men and 
women as well as relations between men and men,” and that American law has been read to 
include both groups. Id. at 568. As a result, the Court couched its decision in terms of due 
process rather than equal protection, because under the “Equal Protection Clause some might 
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn . . . to prohibit the conduct between 
same-sex and different-sex partners.” Id. at 575. 
 76. “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not 
to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.” Id. at 578.  
 77. The Court held:  
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean 
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. 
Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage 
in their conduct without intervention of the government. 
Id. 
 78. Id. at 575. 
 79. Id. at 567. The Court placed the Lawrence decision in line with Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law that prohibited the use of drugs or 
contraception and counseling as to the use of contraceptives), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972) (invaliding a law that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons), 
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invaliding a law that prohibited abortions). Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 564–65. In addition, the Court noted that, post-Bowers, it upheld through the Due 
Process Clause other privacy interests because “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe.” Id. at 574 (quoting Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
 80. The Court stated that sodomy convictions generally resulted from situations of 
“predatory acts against those who could not or did not consent.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569. 
The Court noted that the case before it “[did] not involve minors. It [did] not involve persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not 
easily be refused. It [did] not involve public conduct or prostitution.” Id. at 578.  
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Court also indicated that it may favor rational basis review in future 
challenges to sodomy laws. For example, by claiming that the “Texas 
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual,”81 the 
Court employed language more consistent with rational basis review 
than strict scrutiny.82 
B. Applying the Lawrence Decision in the Military Context 
Because the CAAF used the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers 
to uphold Article 125, the Lawrence decision placed this rationale 
into jeopardy. Marcum and Stirewalt provided the CAAF with its 
first opportunities to determine how Lawrence would affect the 
validity of Article 125 as applied to consenting adults. The CAAF 
rejected the notion that military courts should employ strict scrutiny 
when evaluating the constitutionality of Article 125, noting that “the 
[Supreme] Court did not expressly identify the liberty interest [in 
Lawrence] as a fundamental right.”83 Thus, the court determined that 
a “searching constitutional inquiry,” which looks beyond simply 
whether the conduct fell within the Lawrence liberty interest, is 
required.84  
The CAAF’s evaluation was influenced by the nature of the 
military environment. The CAAF is charged with the “general 
practice of addressing constitutional questions on an as applied basis 
where national security and constitutional rights are both paramount 
interests,”85 so it considers challenges on an “as applied, case-by-case 
basis.”86 The CAAF also held that because both consensual and 
forcible sodomy were proscribed by Article 125, a facial challenge 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Marcum, the government argued that the Court 
intended for a rational-basis standard of review to apply to constitutional challenges to the 
military sodomy law. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 202 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
 83. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 205 (“[W]e will not presume the existence of such a fundamental 
right in the military environment when the Supreme Court declined in the civilian context to 
expressly identify such a fundamental right.”). This argument is similar to the one utilized by 
the CAAF in both Fagg and Henderson, in which where the court refused to find a right to 
heterosexual sodomy absent Supreme Court direction. See supra note 67. 
 84. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 205. 
 85. Id. at 206. 
 86. United States v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
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would be inappropriate.87 This analysis demonstrates that the CAAF 
considers sodomy in the military, even when consensual, to have an 
effect on national security.88 However, the CAAF never addressed or 
evaluated this claim; instead, it accepted the government’s contention 
that the ban on sodomy was necessary without question.89 
The relationship between Article 125 and national security 
suggested to the court that strict scrutiny was inappropriate. The 
CAAF admitted that, under strict scrutiny, Article 125 may be 
 
 87. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206 (“Article 125 addresses both forcible and non-forcible 
sodomy, [so] a facial challenge reaches too far. Clearly, the Lawrence analysis is not at issue 
with respect to forcible sodomy.”). 
 88. The CAAF’s analysis is supported by Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Lawrence, in which she stated that national security may be a legitimate purpose for banning 
sodomy. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor considered 
the statute to be invalid under the Equal Protection Clause, not the Due Process Clause, and 
found that Texas did not have a compelling reason to ban homosexual sodomy. Id. at 583. She 
stated that “[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under 
the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. If Texas, however, could find an interest “such as national 
security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage,” the ban may be permissible. Id. at 
585. By claiming that a legitimate interest may exist that could justify banning homosexual 
sodomy, such as “national security,” Justice O’Connor acknowledged that a legitimate state 
interest exists that would permit a categorical ban on sodomy. Id. This would also satisfy the 
Lawrence majority’s requirement of a rational basis to proscribe sodomy. Id. at 578 (“The 
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”) (emphasis added). 
 89. In discussing the interests of the government, the CAAF stated that amici argued that 
the relationship between Article 125 and military interests may be tenuous. The Court noted: 
[T]he amici do not “dispute that the interests in good order and discipline, and in 
national security, are important. But the importance of those interests is irrelevant, 
because there is simply no basis to conclude that they are even rationally related to 
Article 125, let alone sufficiently advanced by that law to justify its onerous burdens 
on the ‘full right’ to engage in ‘conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of 
liberty.’” Under both arguments, the amici maintain that the government has no 
legitimate or compelling military interest in regulating Appellant’s private conduct. 
Marcum, 60 M.J. at 202. The government countered that Article 125 “criminalizes conduct that 
‘create[s] an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and 
unit cohesion, within the military as recognized by Congress in 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15).” Id. 
(brackets in original). The CAAF agreed with the government’s contention and did not question 
the relationship between Article 125 conduct and its professed military goals. 
 However, the government’s contentions and the decision in Stirewalt are irreconcilable. 10 
U.S.C. § 654 (2005), commonly referred to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” addresses only 
homosexual conduct. If “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is necessary to promote morale, order, 
discipline, and unit cohesion, Article 125 reaches too far by proscribing heterosexual conduct. 
See infra Part V.C. 
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invalidated and should be avoided.90 Instead, the court assumed that 
so long as a military reason could be premised, a conviction under 
Article 125 could be upheld. 
V. HOW THE CAAF MISINTERPRETED LAWRENCE  
A. Lawrence Calls for Strict Scrutiny Review 
The CAAF incorrectly interpreted Lawrence and should have 
invalidated Article 125 under strict scrutiny review. Foremost, the 
CAAF disregarded the Supreme Court’s framing of the issue in 
Lawrence. The Court specifically stated that it misconstrued the 
question before it in Bowers as only questioning the fundamental 
right to homosexual sodomy. Consequently, the Lawrence Court cast 
the question as an issue of a relationship within the “liberty of 
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”91 The 
Court’s failure to state that the liberty interest was fundamental was 
not because the “‘liberty at stake’ was less than fundamental, but 
rather because . . . [the Court] had understated its basic character.”92 
The liberty interest, firmly rooted in the right to privacy, is 
fundamental.93 
 
 90. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 204 (“On the one hand, the interests in military readiness, combat 
effectiveness, or national security arguably would qualify as either rational or compelling 
governmental interests. On the other hand, it is less certain that Article 125 is narrowly tailored 
to accomplish these interests.”). 
 91. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 92. Brief of ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 11, Marcum, 60 M.J. 
198, available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/marcum%20final%20(filed).pdf [hereinafter 
ACLU Brief]. 
 93. The CAAF was correct in stating that the Supreme Court did not identify a new 
fundamental right; however, the CAAF failed to recognize that the Supreme Court merely 
restated an already identified right. To formulate the majority decision, the Lawrence Court 
found that “the most pertinent beginning point” in analyzing anti-sodomy statutes was their 
“decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. Griswold invalidated a 
Connecticut statute that forbid married individuals from using contraception because it violated 
a “zone of privacy” guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). The Lawrence Court explained, however, that “the right 
to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship,” 
and that the Griswold decision stood for the “fundamental proposition that the law impaired the 
exercise of their personal rights.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. Citing Eisenstadt v. Baird and 
Roe v. Wade, the Court found that the “protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a 
substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.” Id. The 
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The Lawrence majority, by specifically placing its decision within 
the context of a long line of cases dealing with the fundamental right 
of privacy, requires that the Court employ strict scrutiny to review 
sodomy statutes.94 Moreover, restating precedent that called for strict 
scrutiny would have been “superfluous” if the Court was merely 
calling for rational basis review.95 When a law burdens a fundamental 
right, the Supreme Court has stated that the government must show 
that the infringing law is “precisely tailored” to a “compelling 
governmental interest.”96 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting argument that the majority called for 
rational basis review by the use of “legitimate interest” language is 
misplaced.97 Other language clearly states that “[the] right to liberty 
under the Due Process Clause” prevents the government from 
 
Court also quoted at length its decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), 
stating that “[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 851). Consequently, proscriptions on sodomy deny individuals this liberty. The Court then 
concluded that “adults may choose to enter upon this relationship [e.g., sodomy] in the confines 
of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.” Id. at 
567. Thus, the appellants in the case had the “full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government.” Id. at 578. The Court’s holding was therefore premised on the 
fundamental right to privacy. 
 94. See supra note 93. 
 95. ACLU Brief, supra note 92, at 13. The majority stated that “[t]he present case does 
not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are 
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public 
conduct or prostitution.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. This was not a call for rational basis 
review. Rather, these hypothetical situations are either actions involving force or actions 
committed on individuals unable to give consent. The CAAF misconstrued these as indicating 
that a categorical ban may be possible because sodomy itself is in some way different from 
other sexual situations. These categories were, however, illustrative of the history of sodomy 
prosecution. Moreover, when a sodomitical act is committed under these circumstances, most 
state laws typically proscribe the actions under other statutes (e.g., forcible sexual assault or 
rape).  
 The Lawrence Court noted that consensual sodomy charges were rarely brought. Id. at 596. 
In addition, the Court pointed out that history showed “a substantial number of sodomy 
prosecutions and convictions for which there are surviving records were for predatory acts 
against those who could not or did not consent.” Id. at 569. Thus, the Supreme Court did not 
attempt to justify rational basis review; rather, the Court indicated that the breadth of historical 
bans was to ensure that “there would be no lack of coverage if a predator committed a sexual 
assault that did not constitute rape as defined by the criminal law.” Id.  
 96. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). 
 97. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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interfering with an individual’s private sexual conduct.98 This 
language is indicative of that used to describe a fundamental right in 
the cases cited by the majority. Further, the majority’s declaration 
that the interests asserted by Texas were “not even legitimate” merely 
indicates that “they were [also] not compelling”; consequently, the 
law would not have survived increased scrutiny.99 Therefore, it is 
unmistakable that the Lawrence majority used strict scrutiny to 
review a law that affected the fundamental right of privacy. 
B. The Constitution also Protects Military Personnel from 
Governmental Intrusion into Their Privacy 
While the CAAF believes that “servicemembers . . . do not share 
the same autonomy as civilians,”100 it has also stated that “men and 
women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards 
and judicial protection behind when they enter military service.”101 
Congress is therefore not “free to disregard the Constitution when it 
acts in the area of military affairs. In that area, as in any other, 
Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process 
Clause.”102 Thus, Congress and the military must show that the 
regulation of sodomy is related to some substantial governmental 
interest. Neither Congress nor the military can merely invoke “the 
phrase ‘war power’ . . . as a talismanic incantation to support any 
exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its 
ambit. Even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations 
safeguarding essential liberties.”103 The Supreme Court and the 
CAAF agree that military personnel are afforded Due Process rights 
in court-martial proceedings.104 In addition, military courts apply 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. ACLU Brief, supra note 92, at 13. 
 100. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
 101. United States v. Mitchell, 39 M.J. 131, 135 (C.M.A. 1994). 
 102. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981). 
 103. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263–64 (1967) (brackets and second internal 
quotation omitted). 
 104. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176 (1994) (“Congress, of course, is 
subject to the Due Process Clause when legislating in the area of military affairs.”); Middendorf 
v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976) (noting that servicemembers are “entitled to the due process of 
law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment”); United States v. Graf, 35 M.J. 450, 460 (C.M.A. 
1992) (“A servicemember at a general court-martial is entitled to the protection of the due 
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heightened scrutiny to congressional laws regulating the military 
environment.105 
The result of this balancing of interests is that, using strict scrutiny 
review of Article 125, the government must demonstrate that the 
criminal sanction is “precisely tailored” to a “compelling 
governmental interest.”106 In its analysis of Article 125, the CAAF 
accepted the government’s argument that Article 125 relates to “high 
standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion,” 
and therefore affects “national security.”107 Moreover, it is 
undisputed that the government’s “interests in military readiness, 
combat effectiveness, or national security arguably would qualify as 
either rational or compelling” interests.108 However, the government 
failed to demonstrate how Article 125 relates to these interests. The 
Supreme Court has stated that courts should “not . . . accept at face 
value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination . . . 
demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of 
the legislation.”109 Further, while there is a general preference for 
“deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of 
military affairs,” this does not mean complete “abdication” to the 
provided explanations.110 Therefore, the government was required to 
show how Article 125 relates to the military interests as it claimed.111 
C. The Necessity of Article 125 Is Further Undermined by the Lack of 
Congressional Findings Regarding Its Purpose 
Congress included no findings in the military anti-sodomy 
provision; thus, the government’s asserted interests are merely post-
hoc rationalizations of Article 125. The CAAF noted that “the range 
 
process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Bygrave, 46 M.J. 491, 497 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (utilizing 
“compelling interest” language in upholding a congressional military regulation); United States 
v. McFarlin, 19 M.J. 790, 792 (C.M.A. 1985) (noting that a “fundamental necessity for 
discipline can be” a sufficient reason to limit the privacy rights of servicemembers). 
 106. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). 
 107. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 202, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
 108. Id. at 204. 
 109. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975). 
 110. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66, 67 (1981). 
 111. See supra note 90. 
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of conduct proscribed by Article 125(a) is consistent with the then-
existing laws of Maryland.”112 However, Congress made “no findings 
as to the possible harmful consequences [of sodomy] upon the 
military community.”113 Given that no sodomy statute proscribing 
consensual sodomy is permissible under Lawrence, a statute based on 
antiquated sodomy proscriptions and whose relationship to military 
interests is unclear should be invalidated.  
Merely reciting that Congress renounced homosexual behavior 
with its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” legislation does not explain its ban 
on sodomy.114 Such a statement misstates the full implications of 
Article 125—a complete ban on homosexual and heterosexual 
sodomy.115 Because “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” does not proscribe 
heterosexual conduct, it cannot be used as an indication of 
congressional intent. Moreover, violations of Article 125 and “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” have vastly different consequences. First, “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” is applicable only to homosexual, not heterosexual, 
sodomy.116 In addition, while servicemembers who violate “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” can only suffer discharge from the military,117 a 
violation of Article 125 can result in significantly more severe 
punishment.118 
 
 112. United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174, 176 (C.A.A.F. 1992). 
 113. United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J. 160, 165 (C.M.A. 1978). 
 114. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206. 
 115. See supra note 89. In Marcum, the government argued that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
demonstrates that Congress considers sodomy to be antithetical to morale, good order, 
discipline, and unit cohesion. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 202. If the CAAF accepted this argument, its 
decision in Stirewalt would be inconsistent with Marcum, because heterosexual sodomy is not 
included under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  
 116. See supra note 89. Moreover, if “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was an indication of 
continued congressional intent to ban sodomy, Congress would have likely reaffirmed this in 
the statute’s history. See S. REP. NO. 103-113, at 293 (1993) (indicating that congressional 
findings were meant only to serve as the “basis for the policy” on discharges implemented by 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). 
 117. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2005). The statute only calls for a member to be “separated 
from the armed forces” and does not proscribe any additional punishments for violation. Id. 
 118. Conviction under Article 125 can result in “[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years.” COURT MARTIAL MANUAL, supra note 14, 
Pt. IV-79, ¶ 51.e.(4). This punishment is more severe than that given for negligent homicide, 
extortion, assault on a child under sixteen, or aggravated assault other than with a loaded 
firearm. See id. at Pt. IV-110, ¶ 85.e; Pt. IV-81, ¶ 53.e; Pt. IV-85, ¶ 54.3.(7), (8). 
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D. Article 125 Fails to Advance and May Be Adverse to Military 
Interests 
Article 125 fails to advance, nor is it even related to, “high 
standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion,” 
and it may actually be adverse to these interests.119 Social science 
data suggests, “based on general population estimates, that a majority 
of both married and unmarried military personnel engage in oral 
[sodomy], at least occasionally.”120 Because acts of sodomy are 
pervasive in both civilian and military contexts, servicemembers who 
engage in sodomy have no demonstrable effect on morale, good order 
or discipline. In addition, “no studies suggest that prohibition of 
sodomy is necessary for preserving or developing unit cohesion, or 
that decriminalizing sodomy would undermine cohesion.”121  
Criminalization of sodomy may, in fact, be detrimental to morale, 
good order and discipline. The Cox Commission recommended the 
repeal of Article 125’s prohibition on consensual sodomy and its 
replacement with a statute more in line with federal statutes 
proscribing aggravated sexual conduct, because most sodomitical acts 
are consensual and prosecutions are often arbitrary or vindictive.122 
Moreover, Article 125 may undermine morale and discipline by 
encouraging servicemembers to be secretive about their sex lives.123  
 
 119. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 202. 
 120. NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL 
POLICY: OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 58 (1993). These conclusions are based on general 
population studies that found that “most Americans evidently consider [oral sex] a ‘normal’ 
sexual variation.” Id. at 57. These studies concluded that “88 percent of men and 87 percent of 
women rated oral sex as ‘very normal’ or ‘all right,’ versus ‘unusual’ or ‘kinky.” Id. In its study 
of sodomy per-anum, the Institute described the data as having problems of “underreporting,” 
because seventy-one percent of men and seventy-six percent of women described the act as 
“‘unusual’ or ‘kinky,’” which makes self-reporting more unlikely. Id. at 60. Thus, it is difficult 
to know the true prevalence in any population of anal sodomy. Id. at 60–62. 
 121. Brief of Social Scientists and Military Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant 
at 7, Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDN_ARTICLES/ 
pdf_file/1173.pdf (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Social Scientists Brief]. 
 122. COX COMMISSION, supra note 66, § 111(D).  
 123. ACLU Brief, supra note 92, at 15. Moreover, as a matter of law, “[c]onduct can harm 
good order and discipline as a matter of law only if it is illegal in the civilian context.” Id. at 16. 
The only time that the CAAF found that sodomy hindered morale was when it was illegal in the 
civilian context as well, and the court concluded this without comment or explanation. See 
United States v. McFarlin, 19 M.J. 790, 792 (A.C.M.R. 1985). 
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There are far less restrictive means than a categorical ban on 
sodomy by which to advance military interests. In both Marcum and 
Stirewalt, the CAAF was reticent to find the defendants’ conduct 
permissible because they engaged in the proscribed act with 
servicemembers in their chain-of-command. Any sexual activity 
could potentially affect morale and discipline, so the military and 
Congress could still ban sodomy as it bans other sexual behaviors 
within the military.124 For instance, in cases such as Marcum and 
Stirewalt, the military could have proceeded under Article 134,125 
which prohibits superior-subordinate relationships, or under Article 
92.126 These alternatives mean that any sexual relationship could still 
be prosecuted.127 
E. Lower Military Appellate Courts Have Indicated that Article 125 
Does Not Prohibit Sodomy Committed by a Servicemember and a 
Civilian 
The Army Court of Military Review (ACMR) ruled in November, 
2004, that, under Marcum, certain proscriptions on sodomy by the 
military are unconstitutional.128 In United States v. Bullock, the 
 
 124. Social Scientists Brief, supra note 121, at 8–9. 
 125. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2005). 
 126. Id. § 892. In Marcum, the CAAF noted:  
Among other things, Appellant was convicted of non-forcible sodomy with a 
subordinate airman within his chain of command. An Air Force instruction prohibits 
such sexual conduct between servicemembers in differing pay-grades and within the 
same chain of command. This instruction provides for potential criminal sanctions 
through operation of Article 92. This instruction evidences that Senior Airman 
H[arrison], Appellant’s subordinate, was in a military position where “consent might 
not easily be refused.” 
Marcum, 60 M.J. at 200 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). Likewise, in 
Stirewalt, the CAAF referred to the Coast Guard regulation prohibiting fraternization. Thus, 
both TSgt Marcum and HST Stirewalt could have been prosecuted for violating an order under 
Article 92. 
 127. The limitation of Article 134 is that the military must show that some harm came from 
the relationship to proscribe fraternization. Article 134 requires that a court martial find that, 
“under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” 
COURT MARTIAL MANUAL, supra note 14, at Pt. IV-109, ¶ 83.b.  
 128. United States v. Bullock, ARMY 20030534, at *5 (A.C.M.R. 2004) (“Appellant 
described conduct with a civilian, with no military connection other than that it occurred in a 
barracks room. Appellant did not admit any facts during the providence inquiry which 
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defendant was accused of engaging in sodomy with a civilian while 
in his barracks room.129 The ACMR held that the defendant’s guilty 
plea could not be accepted because Article 125, as applied, was 
unconstitutional.130 In analyzing the conduct under Marcum, the court 
determined that, because the sodomy involved a servicemember and a 
civilian, there was no “military necessity” that would require the 
proscription of the conduct.131 Consequently, Article 125, as applied 
to the defendant, was unconstitutional.132 
The ACMR’s decision demonstrates the shortcomings of the 
CAAF’s post-Lawrence interpretation of Article 125. The only 
factual difference between Bullock and Marcum or Stirewalt is the 
status of the individuals who engaged in the sodomy at issue. The 
court has failed to elaborate why sodomy, in and of itself, is adverse 
to the military environment. Placing Bullock in the context of the 
most recent decisions on Article 125 demonstrates that the only 
military objection is that servicemembers should not engage in 
private, sexual activity with one another. There is not an independent 
explanation why sodomy is adverse to “high standards of morale, 
good order and discipline, or unit cohesion.”133 
F. Redefining the Military Ban on Sodomy 
It is undisputed that forcible acts of sodomy are antithetical to the 
military environment and to the general public. Therefore, to preserve 
a military ban on forcible sodomy while protecting the liberty interest 
guaranteed by Lawrence, Congress need only make slight changes to 
Article 125. Major Baime, writing before Lawrence, argued that, to 
protect an inherent right to privacy, Article 125 should be revised to 
read:  
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in 
unnatural carnal copulation with another person by force, with 
 
demonstrated any military necessity to circumscribe his liberty interest in engaging in private, 
consensual behavior with another adult.”). 
 129. Id. at *2. 
 130. Id. at *4. 
 131. Id. at *5. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 202. 
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an individual under the age of 16, or with an animal is guilty of 
sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete 
the offense.  
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct.134 
This revision would preserve a sufficient balance between the 
military need to proscribe forcible sodomy and the liberty interests of 
individual servicemembers. 
In the alternative, Congress could adopt the changes to the UCMJ 
advocated by the Cox Commission.135 This would essentially place 
the military proscription on sodomy in line with civilian law 
concerning sexual conduct.136 The resulting provision would preserve 
the liberty interests of individuals while providing a comprehensive 
statute for the military. 
CONCLUSION 
The CAAF failed to correctly analyze Lawrence and should have 
held Article 125 unconstitutional. The military does not have any 
legitimate reason to ban private, consensual sodomy. Thus, Congress 
should remove the categorical ban on sodomy and replace it with a 
directed ban on only forcible sexual activity. 
 
 134. Baime, supra note 69.  Maj. Baime argues that this 
proposed language specifically removes the phrase “with another person of the same 
or opposite sex,” to acknowledge the constitutionally protected status of consensual 
oral and anal sodomy committed in private. There is no specific language added 
concerning marital status or sexual orientation because the right to privacy applies 
equally to all individuals. Also, the phrase “unnatural carnal copulation . . . with an 
animal” remains to address bestiality, which should remain prohibited due to 
compelling state interests. Therefore, the net effect of the change is to eliminate private 
consensual sodomy as a crime under the UCMJ, and thus protect the constitutional 
right to privacy. 
Id.  
 135. See supra note 66. 
 136. See supra note 67. 
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In Spring, 2005, several news reports indicated that the Pentagon 
had asked Congress to alter Article 125 and possibly decriminalize 
consensual sodomy. These reports, however, have proven to be 
incorrect. Instead, its appears that the pentagon only wanted to 
reclassify consensual sodomy as a separate offense.137  
 
 137. Sodomy to Remain a Crime: Pentagon, HERALD SUN (Melbourne, Austl.), Apr. 22, 
2005.  
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